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I. Some Opening Musings 
 
An ongoing discussion among prisoners’ rights advocates, 
since the passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(PLRA) restricting the powers of federal courts to provide 
remedies in conditions of confinement litigation,1 has been 
whether such litigation remains a viable means of assuring 
decent and humane conditions of confinement within the 
nation’s prisons, jails, and juvenile facilities.  While I cannot 
quarrel with the basic premise that prison litigation is by itself 
not enough to assure decent conditions, we should not be too 
hasty in abandoning prison litigation as one of the major 
vehicles for prison reform. 
I once had a conversation with opposing counsel in one of 
my cases that illustrates why prison litigation has survived the 
passage of the PLRA, as well as an increasingly hostile federal 
bench, and, in particular, why consent decrees will continue to 
play a major role in such litigation.  As we argued over 
discovery in connection with a forthcoming court hearing, he 
asked why we had to have these hearings all the time.  Why 
couldn’t the state’s employees and our experts just sit around a 
table and concentrate on fixing what is wrong?2 
 
  Elizabeth Alexander is in private practice in Washington, D.C., 
specializing in conditions of confinement litigation. 
1. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PILRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 
110 Stat. 1321 (1996). 
2. These post-PLRA hearings have been much more intensive than 
previous hearings, as well as more frequent.  PLRA is not solely responsible 
for this escalation in litigation warfare in conditions-of-confinement cases 
since 1996; an increasingly conservative federal bench has also imposed 
heavier evidentiary requirements on prisoner litigants.  See, e.g., Lewis v. 
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) (imposing requirement of proof of actual 
injury in access to courts cases); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1991) 
(imposing requirement of proof of “deliberate indifference” by prison officials 
to show violation of Eighth Amendment in prison conditions of confinement 
litigation); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981) (imposing 
requirement of proof of “unnecessary or wanton pain” or conditions that are  
1
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With some amusement I reminded him that we were 
having the hearing because defendants had filed a motion to 
terminate injunctive relief pursuant to PLRA,3 which 
defendants had lost, and this new hearing would address 
whether defendants’ latest self-correction plan, along with a 
new injunction, had cured the constitutional violations.  In fact, 
prior to the passage of PLRA, the parties had spent a fair 
amount of time attempting to negotiate changes in defendants’ 
behavior that would have satisfied the requirements of the 
consent decree in the case, with court filings occurring only 
when negotiations did not work. 
Under the particular circumstances of the case in question, 
even under PLRA it was a reasonable strategy for plaintiffs 
and defendants to substitute negotiations for endless litigation.  
The frustration that defendants’ counsel felt with their own 
strategy of pursuing termination through PLRA is, I suspect, 
not a completely isolated event.  Obviously, after the enactment 
of PLRA, prison-conditions litigators lost a huge number of old 
cases that were in monitoring status, and we learned how 
difficult it can be to litigate new cases in light of the exhaustion 
requirement.4 
 
“grossly disproportionate” to the need to punish criminal behavior  to show 
violation of Eighth Amendment in prison conditions of confinement cases).  
Nonetheless, there is tremendous synergy between PLRA and these 
evidentiary burdens: evidentiary hearings are both more frequent and 
require far more preparation by plaintiffs’ counsel.  As a result, litigating 
these cases post-PLRA has been exhausting for both sides and I suspect that, 
in the cases in which termination motions have failed, defendants have often 
spent more money on attorneys’ fees than they would have expended if the 
litigation had taken place before 1996, despite the restrictions on fees that 
PLRA imposes.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (2006) (limiting hourly fees to no 
more than 150% of Criminal Justice Act rates (set by 18 U.S.C. § 3006A) for 
representing indigent criminal defendants in federal prosecutions). 
3. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b) (2006) (allowing defendants in prison conditions of 
confinement cases to file a motion to terminate an existing court injunctive 
order if it lacks certain required findings or, if the order does contain the 
required findings, allowing the filing of a motion for termination at various 
intervals; in either case relief is not to terminate if relief remains necessary 
to correct a current and ongoing violation of federal law). 
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006) (requiring exhaustion of available 
administrative remedies before a prisoner can file litigation regarding his or 
her conditions of confinement).   For an excellent discussion of the effects of 
PLRA on prisoner conditions of confinement litigation, see Margo Schlanger, 
Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court 
Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. (2006). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/19
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At the same time, in cases in which prison litigators have 
possessed the facts and the necessary resources, some 
defendants learned the hard way that filing a termination 
motion produced never-ending court battles rather than 
victory.  Indeed, in a small minority of cases, PLRA has 
paradoxically added to the litigation burdens on prison-official 
defendants, even as in countless ways the Act has given them 
“get out of court free” cards.  For example, some PLRA 
termination hearings have resulted in courts entering new 
injunctive orders in old cases.5  This should come as no 
surprise.  Logically, if plaintiffs show that a constitutional or 
statutory violation of federal law persists despite an existing 
court order addressing the issue, then the existing order, 
having proven ineffective, needs to be modified or replaced to 
eliminate the violation. 
PLRA has also at times had a paradoxical effect on the 
negotiation of consent decrees.  Because prison-conditions 
litigators can and do win cases, it follows that there are a 
significant number of circumstances in which it is in the 
interest of defendants to attempt to settle these cases.  While 
some of those in Congress who voted for PLRA may have 
thought that it was outlawing consent decrees in prison 
conditions cases, such agreements have survived precisely 
because they serve defendants’ interests in some cases.  
Further, in certain circumstances, by mandating restrictions on 
the conditions under which a federal court is permitted to enter 
a consent decree, PLRA has caused defendants to agree to more 
strenuous terms than would have been the case in the absence 
of the Act.  This article explores some of the ways that parties 
have continued to negotiate consent decrees post-PLRA, and 
points out some of the consequences of PLRA in this context. 
 
 
5. See, e.g., Gates v. Barbour, No. 4:71CV6-JAD (N.D. Miss. June 7, 
2004) (ordering that HIV-positive prisoners be integrated in work release 
programs; order directly resulted from proceedings following defendants’ 
filing of PLRA termination motion) (on file with author); Hadix v. Caruso, No. 
4:92-CV-110, 2005 WL 2671289 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 2005) (issuing 
preliminary injunction requiring defendants to submit a plan to improve the 
medical care for prisoners in segregation unit and in specialized medical 
housing units at the prison; injunction resulted directly from proceedings 
related to pending termination hearing). 
3
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II. The Movement to Bar Consent Decrees in Institutional 
Litigation  
 
PLRA contains a hodgepodge of provisions, codified in 
multiple sections of the United States Code, that have as their 
intended effect restrictions on the ability of prisoners to litigate 
their claims of constitutional or statutory violations in federal 
court, or restrictions on the abilities of federal courts to redress 
these grievances.6  While there were undoubtedly many sources 
for the various restrictions, the central organizing theme of the 
arguments in favor of the Act was that “frivolous” prisoner 
litigation needed to be stopped.  On one level, PLRA 
constituted symbolic legislation expressing disapproval of 
prisoner conditions-of-confinement litigation7 at the same time 
that it fulfilled a promise made by Republicans in the “Contract 
with America.”8 
The provisions appearing to restrict consent decrees 
drastically, however, have a provenance that extends far 
beyond prisoner-bashing.  Conservatives have long argued that 
federal courts should not enforce consent decrees made by 
public officials that go beyond the command of federal law 
because to do so is inconsistent with democratic principles, 
inappropriately allows officials to escape the confines of state 
law by binding their successors, and violates core tenets of 
federalism.9 
This is not an argument solely directed at consent decrees 
regarding prison conditions of confinement, but various 
versions of this argument have long been used to challenge 
 
6. See, e.g., Schlanger, supra note 4 (discussing effects of various PLRA 
provisions). 
7. See Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: 
The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 64 (1997) (arguing that PLRA 
constitutes symbolic litigation). 
8. See CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, 
REP. DICK ARMEY AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION 43-44, 
53 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schelhas eds., 1994) (promising action to address the 
problem of “frivolous” prison litigation). 
9. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Why Hold Elections? Using Consent 
Decrees to Insulate Policies from Political Change, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295, 
297 (arguing that consent decrees limiting the power of future office holders 
are anti-democratic). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/19
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such consent decrees.  In Duran v. Carruthers,10 for example, 
New Mexico poured considerable resources into an attempt to 
break the consent decree that its officials signed in the wake of 
a riot at the New Mexico Penitentiary in which thirty-three 
prisoners had died.11  The State argued that the requirements 
of the decree went far beyond the requirements of federal law, 
and thus violated the requirements of the Eleventh 
Amendment.12 
The court of appeals disagreed.  It examined each 
challenged provision of the decree, and determined that the 
remedies specified in the decree related to federally protected 
rights.  It noted that New Mexico could have proceeded to trial 
to test whether the relief provided by the consent decree was 
actually required by federal law; if such relief was required by 
federal law, there could be no Eleventh Amendment violation.13  
By agreeing to the consent decree, however, New Mexico 
waived its right to contest the necessity of the provisions of the 
consent decree under federal law.14  Only in the Fifth Circuit 
did the argument presented in Duran gain much traction.15 
Subsequent to PLRA, the Supreme Court considered a 
similar argument in the context of Texas’ challenge to a 
consent decree involving federal Medicaid provisions.  In Frew 
v. Hawkins,16 the Court reviewed a case in which the Fifth 
Circuit had accepted Texas’ argument that, in order to enforce 
a particular provision of a consent decree based on federal law, 
a federal court first had to determine that a federal right had 
been violated, and that enforcement of the provision in 
question would address that violation.17  The Supreme Court 
 
10. 885 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1989). 
11. Id. at 1486. 
12. Id. at 1487. 
13. Id. at 1487-91 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) 
(holding that state defendants are not protected by Eleventh Amendment 
against litigation seeking injunctive relief for violation of federal law)). 
14. Duran, 885 F.2d at 1489-91. 
15. See Leltz v. Kavanagh, 807 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1987) (refusing to 
enforce a consent decree because the court found that the relief was based on 
state law); Saahir v. Estelle, 47 F.3d 758, 761 (5th Cir. 1995) (refusing to 
allow enforcement of a consent decree regarding prison conditions because, 
the court found, the decree was not based on federal law). 
16. 540 U.S. 431 (2004). 
17. Frazar v. Gilbert, 300 F.3d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that a 
consent decree is not enforceable against a state except to vindicate a federal 
5
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unanimously rejected that argument, reasoning that, given the 
concession of the state defendants that they were not 
challenging the entry of the consent decree, there could be no 
Eleventh Amendment bar to its enforcement.18  While the 
decree implemented the federal statute in a highly detailed 
way, and required the state to take some steps that the statute 
by its own force did not require, those features did not pose a 
bar to enforcement of the consent decree: 
 
The same could be said, however, of any effort to 
implement the [statute at issue] in a particular 
way.  The decree reflects a choice among various 
ways that a State could implement the Medicaid 
Act.  As a result, enforcing the decree vindicates 
an agreement that the state officials reached to 
comply with federal law.19 
 
With the decision in Frew, the theory that the Eleventh 
Amendment has a significant role to play in preventing states’ 
agreements to consent decrees has been rejected in its starkest 
form.20  While occasional bills continue to be introduced in 
Congress that would extend the PLRA restrictions on consent 
decrees to other areas, these efforts have yet to be successful.21  
Accordingly, the only question is the extent to which PLRA 
actually restricts the ability of federal courts to approve 
settlement agreements involving prison conditions-of-
 
right), rev’d sub nom., Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004). 
18. Frew, 540 U.S. at 439. 
19. Id. 
20. But see Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2593-94 (2009) (while Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) provision allowing relief from injunctive judgment on the 
ground that it is not equitable may not be used to challenge the legal 
conclusions on which a prior judgment is based, the Rule does provide a 
means for modification in light of changed legal or factual circumstances; 
cautioning that consent decrees binding public officials may improperly bind 
state and local officials to the policy preferences of their predecessors). 
21. See, e.g., S. 489, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005) (providing that, four years 
after the entry of a consent decree in any federal court in which a state or 
local government is a party, the governmental party may file a motion 
seeking to modify or vacate the consent decree, and further providing that the 
“burden of proof” shall be on the party who originally filed the civil action to 
demonstrate that the continued enforcement of the decree is “necessary to 
uphold a federal right”). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/19
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confinement litigation. 
 
III. Legal Support for Consent Decrees Governed by PLRA 
 
The relevant provisions of PLRA do not purport to ban 
consent decrees; they instead mandate that federal courts 
refuse to approve any consent decree that does not meet the 
general requirements for approval of relief in a prison 
conditions-of-confinement case.22  These familiar requirements 
are as follows: 
 
Prospective relief in any civil action with respect 
to prison conditions shall extend no further than 
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal 
right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs.  The 
court shall not grant or approve any prospective 
relief unless the court finds that such relief is 
narrowly drawn, extends no further than 
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal 
right, and is the least intrusive means necessary 
to correct the violation of the Federal right.  The 
court shall give substantial weight to any 
adverse impact on public safety or the operation 
of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.23  
 
The Act does not prohibit private settlement agreements 
that do not comply with the PLRA limits on relief if the only 
remedy provided by the agreement is reinstatement of the 
litigation.24  Nor does the Act bar a plaintiff who claims that a 
settlement agreement has been breached from seeking state 
court enforcement of a remedy.25 
The only case that comments on post-PLRA prison 
condition settlements is Cason v. Seckinger,26 in which the 
Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s termination of a 
pre-PLRA consent decree.  The court held that the plaintiffs 
 
22. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(c) (2006). 
23. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
24. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(c)(2)(A) (2006). 
25. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(c)(2)(B) (2006). 
26. 231 F.3d 777 (11th Cir. 2000). 
7
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were entitled to an evidentiary hearing prior to a ruling on the 
termination motion; that the possibility of a future violation of 
law from existing practices would not prevent termination; and 
that particularized findings and analysis of the 
appropriateness of continued injunctive relief were necessary 
to continue such relief.27 
Significantly, the court of appeals discussed the need for 
particularized findings in the context of a defendant’s motion 
for termination.  The court recognized that this requirement 
did not apply to the parties’ agreements regarding injunctive 
relief; to the contrary, the court noted that the parties retain 
their ability to reach stipulations, and have those stipulations 
approved by the court, in the context of cases covered by PLRA: 
 
Of course, we do not mean to suggest that the 
district court must conduct an evidentiary 
hearing about or enter particularized findings 
concerning any facts or factors about which there 
is not dispute.  The parties are free to make any 
concessions or enter into any stipulations they 
deem appropriate.28 
 
This dictum in Cason is the only published decision I could 
locate discussing the issue of the parties’ freedom to meet the 
statutory requirements of PLRA through stipulation.  It is fully 
consistent with the language of PLRA, which recognizes that 
consent decrees will continue to exist.29 
It is also consistent with general principles of legal 
analysis.  In Local Number 93, International Association of 
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland,30 the Supreme Court 
considered a very similar issue.  That case involved a section of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196431 that prohibits any 
court from ordering injunctive relief benefitting any employee 
who had not been the victim of discrimination.  The Court 
 
27. Id. at 781-85. 
28. Id. at 785 n.8. 
29. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(c)(1) (2006) (specifying the conditions for entry of a 
consent decree in a case subject to the restrictions of PLRA).  Thus, it cannot 
be argued that consent decrees are prohibited under PLRA. 
30. 478 U.S. 501 (1986). 
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2006). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/19
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considered whether this provision prohibited court approval of 
a consent decree utilizing racial preferences that might benefit 
persons who were not the actual victims of racial 
discrimination.  It rejected that argument, relying on its 
understanding of the history of the Title VII provision, which it 
construed as intended to prevent employers from being forced 
to eliminate racial discrimination through remedies that aided 
non-victims, but not to preclude employers from voluntarily 
remedying discrimination in this manner.32  The Court went on 
to articulate the principles that govern the scope of consent 
decrees suitable for approval by federal courts: 
 
Accordingly, a consent decree must spring from 
and serve to resolve a dispute within the court’s 
subject-matter jurisdiction.  Furthermore, 
consistent with this requirement, the consent 
decree must come within the general scope of the 
case made by the pleadings and must further the 
objectives of the law upon which the complaint 
was based.  However, in addition to the law 
which forms the basis of the claim, the parties’ 
consent animates the legal force of a consent 
decree.  Therefore, a federal court is not 
necessarily barred from entering a consent 
decree merely because the decree provides 
broader relief than the court could have awarded 
after a trial.33 
 
Federal law thus recognizes a broad area in which 
defendants may decide to stipulate to relief without requiring 
plaintiffs to make an evidentiary showing justifying that relief.  
Necessarily, this scope is particularly wide with regard to 
issues in which the existence of a violation of federal law is 
dependent on proof of particular facts, or where a particular 
violation might be addressed in various ways.34 
 
32. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. at 520-22. 
33. Id. at 525 (internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets 
omitted).  Frew cited this language with approval.  Frew v. Hawkins, 540 
U.S. 431, 438 (2004). 
34. The Court’s classic expression of this principle occurs in Swift & Co. 
v. United States:  
9
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IV. Post-PLRA Consent Decrees 
 
My office has collected a number of examples of post-PLRA 
consent decrees and related orders.35  Although this collection 
includes but a tiny sample of the variety of actual post-PLRA 
orders, the amount of diversity in form, language and context 
of these orders is striking.  Many of these orders are not called 
orders; they use a variety of procedural devices, including 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 68 offers of judgment, 
and some involve relatively minor aspects of a case and are 
relatively informal while others closely resemble traditional 
consent decrees. 
 
A. Forms of Orders 
 
At least in my office’s collection, the most common name 
for these documents is “Settlement Agreement,” or some close 
variant, even when the document clearly contemplates some 
form of court enforcement.36  For example, the fifty-seven page 
“Memorandum of Agreement” in Doe v. Cook County37 
 
 
Here again the defendants ignore the fact that by 
consenting to the entry of the decree without any findings of 
fact, they left to the Court the power to construe the 
pleadings, and, in so doing, to find in them the existence of 
circumstances of danger which justified compelling the 
defendants to abandon all participation in these businesses, 
. . . and to abstain from acquiring any interest hereafter. 
 
276 U.S. 311, 329 (1928) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
35. This article does not address agreements that contemplate relief only 
in state court or relief limited to the reinstatement of the litigation pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. § 3626(c)(2) (2006).  Further, this article is based on my 
collection of orders related to PLRA, and that collection is far from complete.  
I do not necessarily endorse any of the orders discussed in this article as 
models for future litigation. 
36. The term “settlement agreement” is ambiguous because such 
documents may or may not be enforceable in federal court.  In order for 
settlements in federal cases that have been dismissed to be enforced, the 
terms of the settlement must be reflected in some form in the order of the 
court reflecting acceptance of the agreement.  See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life 
Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994). 
37. No. 99 C 3945 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 2000) (on file with author). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/19
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regulates conditions of confinement at the Cook County, Illinois 
Juvenile Temporary Detention Center.  The Memorandum of 
Agreement provides that, upon its approval by the court, the 
case will be dismissed without prejudice, but the court will 
expressly retain jurisdiction to enter any orders necessary or 
appropriate to enforce the terms of the agreement.38 
Other agreements are clearly designated as consent 
decrees.39  There is no necessary difference in content between 
documents labeled “consent decree” and those labeled 
“settlement agreement” that contemplate court enforcement of 
the negotiated provisions.  While all the consent decrees are 
signed by the district judge, some settlement agreements 
contemplating relief enforceable by the court are approved by 
separate orders while others are simply signed as orders by the 
judge.40 
Some orders that were in fact adopted by stipulation of the 
parties do not give evidence of that fact on their face; they 
simply appear in the record as orders of the court, reciting the 
findings required pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a) for the entry 
of relief.41  In some cases, this form may simply reflect that the 
order embodies a stipulation for relief that the parties did not 
consider of great consequence in the course of the litigation.  In 
other cases, this form may be desired by defendants who find it 
easier to be ordered by a federal court to take some action than 
to agree openly to such relief. 
One order in my office’s files is, in form, a notice of 
acceptance of offer of judgment.  This document is particularly 
interesting because the attached offer of judgment contains 
only defendants’ offer of attorneys’ fees along with statements 
of intent regarding various substantive matters, including an 
offer to close the local county jail by the date by which plaintiffs 
were required to accept or reject the offer of judgment.  The 
offer says nothing, however, about stipulating to the required 
PLRA requirements, or about whether defendants agreed that 
 
38. Id. at 6. 
39. See, e.g., Presley v. Epps, No. 405-cv-00148 [proposed] Consent 
Decree (N.D. Miss. Feb. 20, 2006) (accepted by Minute Order, Apr. 26, 2006) 
(on file with author). 
40. Cf. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. 375. 
41. See, e.g., Carty v. Turnbull, No. 94-78, Order at 1-2 (D.V.I. Sept. 20, 
2000) (on file with author). 
11
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the various promises in the offer of judgment could be enforced 
by the court if plaintiffs accepted the offer.42 
Notwithstanding the ambiguities in the offer of judgment, 
the final judgment in the case filed two days later recites that 
the terms of the judgment meet the requirements of PLRA and 
comply in all respects with 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a).  Further, the 
final judgment orders the defendants to comply with the 
provisions set forth in the offer of judgment.43  Settlement 
agreements also on occasion utilize more than one method of 
meeting PLRA’s requirements.  For example, in a juvenile 
parole case, the parties stipulated both that the case was not 
covered by the PLRA, and that the required PLRA findings had 
been satisfied.44 
Finally, the parties can stipulate to other PLRA findings, 
in addition to those required under § 3626(a)(1).  For example, 
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3) prohibits federal courts from issuing 
orders releasing prisoners from confinement unless a previous, 
less intrusive order has failed to cure the violation of law and 
the defendant has had a reasonable amount of time to comply 
with previous orders for relief.  In addition, such orders can be 
issued only by three-judge courts.45  The parties can stipulate 
to the required findings, with a three-judge court then issuing 
the release order.46 
 
B. Language Sufficient to Comply with PLRA 
 
One traditional advantage of consent decrees for 
defendants was that in many such decrees providing for 
injunctive relief, plaintiffs would accept language in which the 
 
42. Am. Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico v. Bd. of County Comm’rs 
of Valencia, No. 97-1318 LH/WWD, Notice of Acceptance of Offer of 
Judgment, Exh. 1 (D.N.M. Dec. 8, 1997) (on file with author). 
43. Am. Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico, No. 97-1318 LH/WWD, 
Final Judgment at 2 (D.N.M. Dec. 10, 1997). 
44. L.H. v. Schwarzenegger, No. 2:06-CV-02042-LKK-GGH at 1, 4 (E.D. 
Cal. Oct. 7, 2008) (on file with author). 
45. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3) (2006). 
46. See Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, No. 86-2128 (JLG), Population 
Consent Order (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 1998) (order reciting various required 
findings for a prisoner release order is entitled “Population Consent Order” 
and is signed by three judges, with the parties’ consent noted on the order) 
(order on file with author). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/19
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defendants would continue to deny any violation of law.  
Defendants frequently wanted such provisions, both for 
political reasons and for the purpose of defending damages 
actions related to the injunctive claims, while the settling 
plaintiffs were often willing to agree to the defendants’ denial 
of liability in return for the substantive relief offered in the 
consent decree. 
The requirements for the entry of relief in 18 U.S.C. § 
3626(a)(1) may appear in some tension with any attempt by 
defendants to continue to deny legal liability while agreeing to 
the entry of the relief sought by plaintiffs.  As a consequence, a 
number of settlement agreements post-PLRA include explicit 
concessions by defendants that the conditions at issue violate 
the law and that an injunction is necessary to address that 
violation. 
The language in a consent order involving the Women’s 
Detention Center in Baltimore is typical: 
 
The relief granted by this Consent Order is 
narrowly drawn and extends no further than 
necessary to prevent irreparable harm and injury 
to plaintiffs, and the relief afforded by this 
injunction is the least intrusive means necessary 
to prevent irreparable harm as the relief is 
limited to that which is necessary to prevent an 
unreasonable risk of harm and injury to the 
health and safety of plaintiffs.47 
 
This consent order is signed by the court.  The order also finds, 
“based upon the unopposed evidence regarding current 
conditions at WDC” that the relief is appropriate, and it recites 
that the court has made the findings necessary pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3626(a).48  It is highly unlikely that this explicit 
concession of liability by the defendants would have appeared 
but for the existence of PLRA. 
At the same time, many post-PLRA agreements contain 
explicit denials that defendants have conceded the illegality of 
 
47. Duvall v. Glendening, No. JFM-94-2541, Consent Order at 1-2 (D. 
Md. Aug. 22, 2004) (on file with author). 
48. Id. at 2. 
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their conduct, in language similar to such provisions in 
traditional consent decrees.49  Another common feature is to 
allow defendants to stipulate to an “alleged” violation of rights, 
as follows: 
 
The parties stipulate that the terms of the 
Settlement Agreement are narrowly drawn, 
extend no further than necessary to correct the 
alleged violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional 
rights, are the least intrusive means necessary to 
correct the alleged violation of Plaintiffs’ 
constitutional rights, and that the Proposed 
Order submitted to the District Court pursuant 
[to this Settlement Agreement] will include these 
findings.50 
 
One strategy that some settling parties adopt is to combine 
a denial of liability with a stipulation that the agreement meets 
the requirements of PLRA, without specifically setting forth 
those requirements.51  As noted above, another strategy is to 
agree to a form of order in which the court makes the 
findings.52  In other cases the court simply makes the required 
findings.53  A final strategy is for defendants to waive the right 
 
49. A typical formulation appears in the settlement agreement in New 
Times, Inc. v. Ortiz, 1:00-cv-00612-PSF-OES, Settlement Agreement at 9 (D. 
Colo. Aug. 19, 2004) (on file with author): “This Settlement Agreement does 
not constitute an admission of liability against the interest of any party.  It is 
a compromise of a disputed claim for the sole purpose of avoiding the 
expense, hardship and uncertainty of litigation.” 
50. Id. at 8. 
51. See, e.g., McClendon v. City of Albuquerque, No. CV-95-24-MV/ACT, 
Stipulated Agreement Between Plaintiff Intervenors and Defendants at 1-2 
(D.N.M. June 30, 2005) (on file with author). 
52. See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico v. Bd. of County 
Comm’rs of Valencia, No. 97-1318 LH/WWD, Final Judgment at 2 (D.N.M. 
Dec. 10, 1997) (the requisite PLRA findings all appear in the order accepting 
the offer of judgment); Carty v. Turnbull, No. 94-78, Order (D.V.I. Sept. 20, 
2000) (there is no stipulation by the parties, but rather the findings appear in 
the court’s order, with counsel for both parties signing the order). 
53. Jones’ El v. Berge, No. 00-C-0421-C, Opinion and Order at 8-9 (W.D. 
Wis. June 25, 2002) (making required findings in order separate from order 
accepting the parties’ settlement agreement) (on file with author). The 
settlement agreement had referred to “alleged” violations and contained 
defendants’ denial of liability, although defendants also stipulated that the 
agreement was consistent with all PLRA requirements.  Jones’ El v. Berge, 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/19
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to challenge the settlement for a set period.  Thus, while 
defendants in such agreements may not affirmatively concede 
that the proposed agreement meets the PLRA requirements, 
they explicitly agree to forego any challenge for a specified 




Whatever the form, court-ordered relief agreed to by the 
parties persists, despite PLRA, because in a variety of 
circumstances it remains in defendants’ interest to negotiate 
such agreements.  As the Supreme Court has recognized, 
consent decrees allow the parties to “save themselves the time, 
expense, and inevitable risk of litigation.”55  The persistence of 
consent decrees in the post-PLRA world demonstrates not only 
the truth of this observation by the Supreme Court, but the 
continued relevance of prison conditions-of-confinement 
litigation.  Given the extent to which PLRA generally places a 
thumb on the scales of justice in favor of defendants, the fact 
that so many defendants find it necessary to agree to consent 




No. 00-C-0421-C, Settlement Agreement at 11-12 (Jan. 24, 2002) (on file with 
author). 
54. Id. at 11. As noted above, it is not unusual for such settlements to 
adopt more than one strategy to deter a defendant from challenging an 
agreement on PLRA grounds after the agreement has been signed. 
55. United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971). 
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